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The Legacy of Reserve Mining
Daniel A. Farbert
In Reserve Mining Co. v. EPA,' the federal courts first con-
fronted one of the central dilemmas of environmental law. Of-
ten, the magnitude or very existence of a threat to public
health or the environment is shrouded in scientific uncertainty.
In the face of this uncertainty, how much of a burden should
society be willing to bear to eliminate the risk? Judge Bright's
answer to this question on behalf of the Eighth Circuit has be-
come a lodestar for later judges and scholars.
As usual in environmental cases, both the procedural his-
tory and the facts are complex, but a brief overview will suffice
for present purposes.2 Reserve Mining produced large quanti-
ties of "tailings" as a byproduct of its taconite operations, re-
sulting in some local dust problems and, more importantly, in
massive dumping of the tailings in Lake Superior. The litiga-
tion began with a focus on ecology, but shifted dramatically on
the eve of trial when the tailings turned out to contain asbes-
tos. At the high levels found in occupational settings, asbestos
was known to cause respiratory illnesses including cancer. The
small town of Silver Bay was exposed to some airborn tailings
at a barely detectable level. The people of Duluth were also
exposed to asbestos because the city got its water supply from
Lake Superior. No one knew, however, whether ingested as-
bestos was even absorbed into the body, let alone whether it
could cause cancer. A distinguished expert witness, called by
the trial court rather than by the parties, was unable to draw
any firm conclusion whether the asbestos exposures were
harmful. Speaking as a physician rather than a scientist, how-
ever, he believed that reasonable ground for concern existed.
t Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, and Henry J. Fletcher Pro-
fessor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975).
2. For a complete exploration of the facts, see DANIEL FARBER, ECO-
PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE ENvIRONhENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UN-
CERTAIN WORLD ch. 2 (forthcoming 1999).
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In short, as is so often true in environmental law, the case
involved issues on the frontiers of scientific knowledge. The
evidence of harm was neither as speculative as the company
claimed nor as serious as the government alleged. One of the
virtues of Judge Bright's opinion is that it frankly confronts
this uncertainty, resisting the temptation to make the case
look easier by shading the evidence.
As is also quite often true in environmental law, solving
the problem would not be cheap. Angered by the obstructive
tactics of the defendant, the trial judge had ordered an imme-
diate shut-down, which would have thrown thousands of people
out of work and crippled the local economy. A less stringent
remedy would involve switching from water to land disposal for
the tailings, at a cost of $243 million. So, in stark terms, the
question was this: should the company be forced to spend $243
million (or perhaps even shut down) in order to avoid the pos-
sible but unproven risks to public health in Silver Bay and
Duluth?
Judge Bright's answer to this knotty question was that an
immediate shut-down was too draconian, but that the company
could not be allowed to continue indefinitely to place the pub-
lic's health at risk. Hence, the company was ordered to make
the conversion to land disposal expeditiously and to implement
new air pollution controls. In reaching this conclusion, Judge
Bright's opinion combined sensitivity to environmental values
with a sense of proportion about the economic burdens of
regulation.
Reserve Mining is broadly recognized as a leading case on
environmental risks. As of this writing, the opinion has been
cited seventy-two times by federal courts and at least 252 times
in the law reviews.3 And I am not the only commentator to
take note of its importance: others, too, have described Reserve
Mining as a "leading case[ ],"4 "important,"5 and "influential."6
3. Westlaw search on Sept. 16, 1998.
4. A. Dan Tarlock, Safe Drinking Water: A Federalism Perspective, 21
WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POLY REV. 233, 259 n.189 (1997).
5. Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory Board's Report on
"Reducing Risk": Some Overarching Observations Regarding the Public Inter-
est, 22 ENvTL. L. 149, 153 (1992); Frank Prager, Apportioning Liability for
Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 6 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 198, 205 (1986/1987);
Gregory B. Heller, Book Review, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1401, 1404 (1989).
6. Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions
in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327,
377 n.191 (1991).
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Nor is its virtually universal coverage in casebooks any sur-
prise.7 Few casebook editors can resist a case that combines
legal significance, arresting facts, and a thoughtful appellate
opinion.
This is enough to show that Reserve Mining has been sig-
nificant, but we have now had more than two decades for fur-
ther consideration of the issues. One might well wonder
whether Judge Bright's opinion, which was written over twenty
years ago in a rapidly evolving area of the law, retains its vi-
tality today. How well has Judge Bright's solution survived
the test of time?
Today, as in 1975, more extreme positions than Judge
Bright's are vocally proclaimed. Just as they were rejected by
Judge Bright, however, they find little support today. Some
industry advocates continue to argue that no action at all
should be taken without definitive scientific evidence of harm.
But, like Judge Bright, most of us prefer not to wait until peo-
ple start dying or until the ice caps start melting before taking
preventive action. At the other end of the spectrum are abso-
lutists like the trial judge in Reserve Mining, who give no
weight to economic burdens in their quest for environmental
purity; but again, those extremists have little support. Like
Judge Bright, American society still continues to find itself
somewhere in the middle.
Putting aside these extreme positions, the major alterna-
tive to Judge Bright's environmentally sensitive approach to-
day is cost-benefit analysis, which seeks to quantify uncertain
environmental harms in monetary terms. This approach has
strong support in the academy from economists and their law-
school sympathizers, and in public life from important figures
in the Republican Party. But the dominant approach in
American environmental law remains quite similar to that
7. See, e.g., FREDERICK R. ANDERSON ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PRO-
TECTION: LAW AND POLICY 529-53 (2d ed. 1990) (main case plus textual dis-
cussion; Reserve Mining has "decisively influenced" later decisions.); ROGER
W. FINDLEY & DANIEL A. FARBER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 386-95 (4th ed. 1995) (main case); ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 451-52 (1992)
(textual discussion); ZYGM-uNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
POLICY: NATURE, LAw, AND SOCIETY 92-99 (1992) (main case); THOMAS J.
SCHOENBAUM & RONALD H. ROSENBERG, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAW:
PROBLEMS, CASES AND READINGS 755-56 (3d ed. 1996) (one page excerpt). The
second edition of the PLATER book reduces Reserve Mining to note status but
describes it as a "classic" case. PLATER ET AL., supra, at 140 (2d ed. 1998).
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pioneered by Judge Bright: determine whether a risk should be
considered significant and then eliminate the risk to the extent
feasible. Indeed, although demanding greater efforts at quan-
tification than were possible in Reserve Mining, the Supreme
Court would later follow just this approach.8
In my own view, this combination of sensitivity to envi-
ronmental risks with realism about economic costs best fulfills
our profound national commitment to the environment.9 In
short, I believe that, although we have learned more about en-
vironmental law and policy since Judge Bright's opinion in Re-
serve Mining, we have done well to follow down the path he
opened in 1975.
It has been said that hard cases make bad law. This is
sometimes true; but as Reserve Mining illustrates, what is
sometimes true instead is that a hard case can make for a pio-
neering judicial opinion.10
8. See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
653 (1980) (requiring that agency find a "significant risk"); American Textile
Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 509 (1981) (finding that "feasibility," not
cost-benefit analysis, determines appropriate level of regulation).
9. See FARBER, supra note 2, ch. 4 (discussing a defense of this approach
and some suggested refinements).
10. Reserve Mining was not Judge Bright's only significant contribution to
environmental law. Although space does not allow for a discussion of the case
here, I would be remiss if I did not also mention Judge Bright's decision in
Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1981), which expansively con-
strued the federal government's powers to protect wilderness areas.
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